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Baby Richard and Beyond: The Future for

Adopted Children
ANTHONY S. ZITO*
INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 1995, the Baby Richard case came to a much anticipated
end when Otakar Kirchner, accompanied by his wife and attorneys, arrived at
"Baby Richard's" home. Pulling him from his adoptive mother's arms and

carrying him into an awaiting minivan, Baby Richard was taken by his
biological parents to begin another life.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that married parents cannot be deprived

of the care, custody and control of their child for the sole reason that it would
be in the child's best interests ! Rather, a natural parent must first be found
unfit.2 In addition, a determination that a parent does not have physical
custody of a child enables a non-parent to demand a custody hearing under the
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act using the best interests of the child
standard. 3 This custody hearing outcome, however, does not turn on
possession of the child,4 but instead requires a showing that the parent
somehow voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the child
through calculated decision or abandonment.5
While the Baby Richard case has an interesting history, the effects are
only just beginning to surface. One could question whether the logic
surrounding the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was sound. Further, one
wonders if the law that allegedly protects adopted, illegitimate and abandoned
Graduate of Case Western Reserve University B.A., J.D., L.L.M. He is currently
an associate professor at the John Marshall Law School. The author would like to thank Judith
Z. Nash, J.D. 1996 John Marshall Law School, who has given many valuable comments on
earlier drafts. An additional thank you to Michael Pulcanio, 3rd year law student and research
assistant for his invaluable help.
1. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324,331 (RI. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2599 (1995)
(citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 555, (1978), citing Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63, 97 S.Ct. 2094,
2119 (1977)).
2. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 331; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (citing Organization of
FosterFamiliesfor Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. at 862-63).
3. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 335. Section 601(b)(2) states: "(b) A child custody
proceeding is commenced in the court: (2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition
for custody of the child in the county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if
he is not in the physical custody of one of his parents." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/601 (b)(2)(West 1992).
4. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 335.
5. Id.
*
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children truly looks out for the children's best interests. The "best interest"
of a child is a phrase that seems to be tossed around loosely. Is it sound legal
principle or mere rhetoric? While the law is now amended, only time will tell
whether the legislation will prevent a similar saga from ever happening again.
In In re Petition of Kirchner,6 the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether the adoptive parents asserted standing to request a custody
hearing to determine the child's best interests under either section 601 (b)(2)
of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act7 or the 1994
amendment to the Adoption Act.' In Kirchner, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that: (1) habeas corpus was an appropriate method for father to seek
release of son; (2) former adoptive parents lacked standing to seek a custody
hearing; (3) physical possession of child did not entitle former adoptive
parents to a custody hearing; and (4) an amendment to the adoption statute
could not be applied retroactively to adoptive parents to allow them to seek a
custody hearing.9
Courts around the country hear numerous adoption disputes, but the Baby
Richard case was the first time a court discussed the rights of an unwed father
who wanted the opportunity to raise his child but was prevented from doing
so through the intentional deception of the child's biological mother. 10 No
laws or Illinois statutes addressed the rights of all the parties to a failed
adoption. Therefore, Illinois courts faced the problem of deciding Baby
Richard's fate without any direct guidance. Now facts have recently surfaced
that indicate Kirchner is no longer living with his son and the Does may want
to try to regain custody of their "son," Richard.
6. 649 N.E.2d 324 (II1.1995).
7. 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b)(2)(West 1992) [hereinafter Marriage and
Dissolution Act].
8. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 332. The General Assembly passed Public Act 88-550 to
amend the Adoption Act. Id. at 336. The amendment states:
In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for
adoption is denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject
of the proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act. The parties to said proceedings shall be the
petitioners to the adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological
parents whose parental rights have not been terminated, and other parties
who have been granted leave to intervene in the proceedings ....This
amendatory Act of 1994 applies to cases pending on and after its effective
date.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20 (West 1994).
9. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 332, 335, 338. As a matter of law, the court determined
that neither of the statutes applied to the instant case and no further factual issues were to be
determined. Id. at 332.
1995).
10. See generally In Re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (I11.
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Part I of this article examines the facts underlying Baby Richard's case
from the time he was conceived until the time of adoption. Additionally, this
Part analyzes the case law which ensued as a result of emotional complexities
of the Baby Richard situation. This Part also addresses the amendment to the
adoption act known as the "Baby Richard Amendment." Part II of this article
explores Justice McMorrow's differences with the majority opinion.
Furthermore, Part I discusses the Does' possible courses of action and
evaluates how realistic their chances are of regaining custody. Part IV of this
article explores the possibility of a solution.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE BABY RICHARD CASE
Section A of Part I explores the facts giving rise to the birth, adoption,
and the custody change of Baby Richard. Section B discusses the legal
proceedings which ensued to effectuate the Does' adoption of Baby Richard.
Section C analyzes the Illinois Appellate Court review of the finding of
unfitness and the best interests of the child. Section D discusses the Illinois
Supreme Court's first look at the Baby Richard case. Section E analyzes the
Adoption Act Amendment. Finally, Section F explores the Illinois Supreme
Court's second look at the Baby Richard case.
A.

THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE BIRTH, ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
CHANGE OF BABY RICHARD

During the Fall of 1989, Kirchner, 32, and Daniella Janikova, 21, met
while working together at a restaurant." Both were immigrants from
3
Czechoslovakia." Soon thereafter they decided to live together in Chicago.'
The following June, Daniella learned that she was pregnant and was to give
birth in March 1991"4 Immediately after learning of her pregnancy, Daniella
quit working to become a full time cosmetology student. 5 Kirchner was her
sole source of financial and emotional support as they continued to live
together and prepare for the birth of their baby. 6 Although Daniella was
bearing his child, Kirchner delayed plans to marry Daniella, using conflicting
work schedules as his reason.'
11. In the Matter of the Petition of John Doe and Jane Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 (I1.
App. Ct. 1993) rev'd by In re Petition of John Doe and Jane Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 657 (Tully, J., dissenting).
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When Daniella was six months pregnant, Kirchner left the United.States
to return to Czechoslovakia to tend to an ill grandmother." Daniella received
a phone call two weeks later from Kirchner's aunt informing her that Kirchner
9
would not be returning to resume his relations with her.' The aunt stated that
Kirchner had resumed relations with his former girlfriend and they were
married and on their honeymoon. 20 Daniella immediately phoned Kirchner
2
and told him that she no longer wanted to see him. Kirchner denied all the
accusations, but Daniella immediately moved out of their apartment and into
a Chicago shelter for abused women.22
While living in the shelter, Daniella decided to place her baby up for
adoption.' Kirchner returned to Illinois on February 8, 1991. By this time,
however, Daniella had moved out and already scheduled a meeting with the
11, 1991.25
Does (the future adoptive parents) and an attorney on February
During the meetings with the Does, at all relevant times, both the Does'
lawyer and the Does were fully aware of the fact that Daniella knew who the
26
father was and that she intended to tell the father that the baby had died.
Moreover, Daniella asked the Does' attorney if he knew how to fake a birth
certificate. 27 The attorney stated that he could not be party to such a
transaction.
Instead of insisting that Daniella disclose the name of the father so that
he could properly be notified of the adoption proceedings, the Does acqui28
esced in Daniella's plans to tell Kirchner that the baby had died. In fact,
29
they even arranged for Daniella to give birth to the child in another hospital. 30
her uncle.
In mid-February, Daniella left the shelter to live with
Kirchner was completely aware of her whereabouts, but was unsuccessful in
his attempts to contact her.3' Kirchner then asked a friend to mediate on his
behalf, but Daniella refused.3 2 At the end of February, Kirchner sent five

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In the Matter ofDoe, 627 N.E.2d at 649.
Id.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 657-58 (Tully, J., dissenting).
Id. at 659 (Tully, J., dissenting).
Id.
In the Matter ofDoe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.

BABY RICHARD AND BEYOND

19981

449

hundred dollars to Daniella via a friend, but Daniella refused the chariiy. 3 At
no time during this period did Kirchner seek legal advice to assert his.
paternity.34 Eventually, however, the two decided to meet at a restaurant.35
They went through a brief period of reconciliation.3 6 During this time,
Daniella did not inform Kirchner of her decision to give the baby up for
adoption.37 Subsequently, the two separated again and Dahiella gave birth on
March 16, 1991."
Unaware of the change in hospitals, Kirchner inquired about Daniella and
the child at the hospital where they intended that she would give birth. The
hospital had no record of her. 39 Four days after giving biith,*Dariiella signed
a final and irrevocable consent to adoption.' The Does filed. aPetition for.
Adoption the same day, listing the natural father as unknowii.4"' Legal notices
were sent out in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. 2 Baby Richard was given
to the Does.43

Kirchner, knowing that Daniella was close to her due date, telephonied'

Daniella's uncle, and was informed that the baby died three days after birth."
To date, Kirchner never attempted to visit the home of Daniella':s uicle.45 All
communication attempts were done by telephone. 46
Daniella instructed her uncle to lie about the status of the child. On
March 26, 1991, Kirchner called Daniella's uncle twice more to notify him
that he did not believe that Richard was dead.48
Subsequently, Kirchner began visiting the uncle's home after work. 49 , In
the early mornings he would look in parked automobiles for infant car seats
and went through the garbage looking for bottles, diapers and other baby,
paraphernalia.5' His inquiries at several hospitals regarding the birth of his

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 651.
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.

39. Id.
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child were unsuccessful. 5 He also enlisted the help of friends in locating the
3
death certificate for the child. 2 His attempts in this respect also failed.
Finally, in early May, Kirchner was informed by a friend that the baby
did not die, but had been put up for adoption.54 He did not confront Daniella
until May 12, 1991." That same day, he found out that she moved back into
his apartment while he was at work.56 This was the first time he had spoken
to her since their brief reconciliation in March 1991." Daniella then
proceeded to tell him that Baby Richard was adopted and that she had
terminated her parental rights. 8
B.

THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH ENSURED TO EFFECTUATE THE DOES'
ADOPTION OF BABY RICHARD: KIRCHNER FOUND UNFIT

Six days after their reconciliation, Kirchner decided to speak to an
attorney for the first time.59 On June 6, 1991, Kirchner filed an appearance in
the adoption proceeding and on June 13, 1991, he sought leave of court to file
an answer." The trial court struck his answer on the basis that he had no
standing in the adoption proceeding. 6'
Three months later, Kirchner and Daniella got married and on September
62
Kirchner filed a petition to declare paternity. The trial commenced
1991,
23,
on December 9, 1991, and he was found to be the biological father of Baby
Richard.63
On December 23, 1991, the Does filed an amended petition to adopt.'
They alleged that Kirchner was an unfit parent and, therefore, his consent to
the adoption was not necessary. 65 The petition declared that Kirchner had not

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 651.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. In the Matterof Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8
(a)(1), 50/14 (West 1992).
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demonstrated a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility with
respect to his child during the first thirty da ,s of Richard's birth.66
The adoption hearing did not begin until May of 1992.67 At this time, the
trial court agreed with the Does' petition.68 The court entered an order on
May 8, 1992 that Kirchner was an unfit parent. 69 The judgment for adoption
was entered on May 13, 1992.70
Kirchner filed a Notice of Appeal on the day his parental rights were
terminated and five days before the adoption judgment became final.7 The
appeal was not heard until August 1993.7 Baby Richard had then been living
with the Does for two and a half years.7 3 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision for adoption.7
C.

THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT'S REVIEW OF THE FINDING OF
UNFITNESS AND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

The appellate court's opinion reviewed two issues and discussed various
other points. First, the court looked at whether disturbing a judgment of
adoption after a child lived with his adoptive parents for more than two years
would be in the best interest of Baby Richard. Second, the court's decision
regarding whether Kirchner was an unfit parent was based on his failure to
demonstrate reasonable interest, care and concern of Richard during Richard's
first thirty days.76
The court first held that a child is not a chattel, and therefore, belongs to
no one but himself.' The court further stated that both child and parent have

66. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651. See 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1
(D)(1) (West 1992) which states:
"Unfit person" means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to
have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed
for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the
following: ... (b) Failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare.
67. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651.
68. Id.
69. Id. Kirchner's consent was, therefore, not required and his parental rights were
terminated. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 651.
73. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651.
74. Id. at 656.
75. Id. at 652.
76. Id. at 654.
77. Id. at 652.
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78
rights which are protected under the law. In an adoption case, the child is
79
the real "party in interest," and the child's rights should come first. The
court concluded that the best interest of Richard was of foremost importance
in this case.8"
The court reasoned that a child's best interest is not "part of an equation"
82
to be balanced against other interests." It is the sole factor. The court's
logic was based on interpreting a part of the Illinois Adoption Act that stated,
"[t]he best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of
83
paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act."
The court also reasoned that the delay in determining custody was not in
84
the best interest of the child and could further harm him. It supported its
85 The
conclusion with the legislative intent of the Juvenile Court Act.
Juvenile Court Act was designed to ensure "speedy" resolve of questions of
child placement.86 It also states that reunifying families is intended if it is in
the best interest of the child.87 Therefore, the court concluded that it was not
in Richard's best interest to remove him from a family that he had grown to
believe was his own.88 According to the court, the mere existence of the
8
Adoption Act is proof that making a child is not what makes one a parent. "
The court found several of the facts of the case to be so meritless that the
9
court decided that the Does were the better parents for Richard. ' For
example, Daniella, although not technically a party to the case, had tried to
find a fraudulent death certificate for her own child so that Kirchner would not
know of the child. 9 Furthermore, just prior to Richard's birth, she had sexual
92
relations with Otakar Kirchner and then refused to see him again. Shortly

78. Id.
79. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 652.
80. Id. The court distinguished a previous Illinois case that held that the best interest
of the child should not be considered when determining fitness of a biological parent. Id. at 652
n.2.
81. Id. at 652.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court felt that this was the logical stance to take. Id. It reasoned that if it
could focus on the child and diminish the presence of all parental interests, that the decision
would be an easier one to make. Id. See 750 IL.COMp. STAT. ANN. 50/20(a) (West 1994).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 653; see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-14 (West 1992).
86. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 653.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 654.
91. Id. at 653 n.4.
92. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 653 n.4.
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thereafter, she decided that she would commit herself in marriage to the man
that she' left.93
The court took a similar common sense approach to Kirchner's behavior
prior to the birth.94 The court surmised that a man with a reasonable degree
of care and concern for his child would have stayed in close contact with the
birth mother until the child came.95 According to the law, when looking atthe
evidence, a court may also consider what occurred during the pregnancy and
birth.96 In this case, Kirchner was back in Chicago for over a month before
Richard's birth.' He knew the child's due date, "[y]et he did virtually nothing
that a responsible unwed man would do if he expected that a woman would
soon give birth to his child."98 There is no solace for Kirchner to claim that
Daniella did not return his phone calls.99 "More needed to be done to
demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility for the
welfare of one's expected child."'' He never went to Daniella to speak to her
in person, even though he knew her whereabouts."' He did not contact
Daniella to check on the baby's health."° He did not show any effort in giving
Richard a first or surname.0 3 He never consulted with an attorney to ascertain
his legal rights prior to birth."° He never filed a lawsuit to either assert his
paternity or determine his rights to Richard until well after Richard's birth.0 5
Furthermore, the court decided that Kirchner's actions within Richard's
first thirty days of life also demonstrated a lack of concern."° He made a few
telephone calls to Daniella's uncle and also allegedly visited the hospital
where Richard was supposed to be born." He went to the uncle's house to
search Daniella's car and garbage cans for baby paraphernalia."8 He asked
friends to speak to Daniella, but did not attempt to do so himself except over
the phone."° The court decided that seeking to find whether a child was alive
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 654-56.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 655.
Id.; see 750 ILt COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7 (West 1992).
In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 655.
Id. Daniella was living with her uncle at the time. Id.
Id.
Id.
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or dead is not enough to determine that an unwed father demonstrated a
reasonable amount of care, concern and interest for his child.' Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the judgment of adoption 'on the basis that Kirchner
was an unfit parent to have a child.'' Therefore, his consent to adoption was
not required."
D.

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S FIRST LOOK AT THE BABY
'RICHARD CASE

The Illinois Supreme Court obtained its first chance to review the Baby
Richard Decision in June 1994."' In a brief majority opinion, the court ruled
that there was enough evidence to show that Kirchner demonstrated a
reasonable degree of interest in his child." 4 Pursuant to section 8(a)(1) of the
Adoption Act, where the birth mother is not married to the father, his consent
to the adoption is essential except where he has been found unfit by clear and
convincing evidence.' Among the statutory factors for finding unfitness is
the provision where the father fails to demonstrate a reasonable degree of
6
interest in the newborn child during the first thirty days after its birth." In an
attempt to learn the truth about Richard, Kirchner called various hospitals and
sorted through Daniella's garbage cans in his search to know the truth about
his child." 7 Although the trial court did not deem this to be sufficient to show
an interest in the baby, the Illinois Supreme Court did, thus deeming Kirchner
a fit parent." 8
The finding of Kirchner being a fit parent, however, was not the key to
the court's ruling. It was only when the finger was pointed at both Daniella
and the Does that the court illustrated why Kirchner had every right to Baby
Richard." 9 The court placed the blame on the Does for not somehow forcing
20 The Does and their
Daniella to divulge the name of the baby's father.
lawyer were always aware that Daniella knew who the father was, and that she

110. Id.
111. Id. at 656.
112. Id.; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8(a)(1), 50/14 (West 1992).
113. In re Petition of John Doe and Jane Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), cert denied
Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994 (1994), cert. denied Doe v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 994
(1994).
114. Id. at 182.
115. Id.; see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8 (West 1992).
116. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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did not want to come forward with his name in fear of him filing for
In fact, not only did the Does know of her secrets; but they
custody.'
assisted in insulating Baby Richard from Kirchner."' They helped in
arranging for Daniella to give birth in another hospital and they acquiesced in
Daniella's scheme to tell Kirchner that his child died at birth.'2 3 Moreover,
the Does continued this subterfuge in their adoption petition filed with the
circuit court,24 which falsely alleged under oath that the father was
"unknown."' The court went on to reason that if the best interests were the
only standard by which courts were bound, then few parents would be secure
in their own qualifications as parents.1 25 People in a superior financial
position or even those highly educated could potentially take a child away
from the natural parents. 2 6
The Illinois Supreme Court chastised the court below for not realizing
that the burden to demonstrate the unfitness of the birth parents, and to notify
both natural parents of the action (so that the natural parents may assert their
rights), belongs to the adoptive parents. 27 Justice Heiple took it upon himself
to strongly denounce the legislature, the governor and Bob Greene (a Chicago
journalist) for their involvement in the case.'28
E.

THE ADOPTION ACT AMENDMENT: STANDING OF NON-PARENT TO SUE
FOR CUSTODY OF CHILD IS ADDRESSED

Less than three weeks after the Illinois Supreme Court issued its decision
on June 16, 1994, reversing the trial and appellate courts' decisions in
Kirchner,the General Assembly held an emergency session to pass Public Act
88-550, which amended the Adoption Act.' 29 The amendment provides, inter
alia:
In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a
petition for adoption is denied, the court shall promptly
conduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent
121. Id.
122. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
123. In the Matter of Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 650.
124. Id. at 659.
125. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
126. Id. at 183.
127. Id. at 182. In Illinois, the law requires a good faith effort to notify the natural
parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any considerations
of the best interests of this child. Id.
128. Id. at 189-90 (Heiple, J., in support of the denial of rehearing).
129. In re Petition of Kirchner,649 N.E.2d 324, 336 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied 115 S.Ct.
2599 (1995). See Pub. Act 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994 (adding 750 ILL COMp. STAT. ANN. 50/20).
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custody of the minor child who is the subject of the proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act. The parties said proceedings
shall be the petitioners to the adoption proceedings, the
minor child, any biological parents whose parental rights
have not been terminated, and other parties who have been
granted leave to intervene in the proceedings . . .The
provisions of this Section shall apply to all cases pending on
or after July 3, 1994.130
The amendment became effective on July 3, 1994, prior to the Illinois
"The
Supreme Court's denial of the adoptive parents' writ of certiorari.'
principle of separation of powers is embodied in Article II, section 1, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides: 'The legislative, executive and
judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another."" 32 The Kirchnercourt expressed the proposition that
the General Assembly is not a court of last resort and it may not attempt to
retroactively apply new statutory language to annul a prior decision of the
court.133
The Illinois Supreme Court based its decision not to retroactively apply
34
the amendment in Kirchner,upon the decision in In re Marriageof Cohn.
Similarly, in Cohn, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the applicability of
an amendment to the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act passed by the
legislature subsequent to the appellate court adjudicating the case.135 The
Cohn court held that although the legislature may change a law as interpreted
by the courts prospectively, it cannot retroactively alter a statute with the
explicit intent to overrule the decision of a reviewing court.' 36
Based on the analysis in Cohn, the Kirchner court reasoned that the
General Assembly may enact retroactive legislation that changes a prior
decision of a reviewing court concerning others whose circumstances are
similar, but whose rights have not been finally adjudicated.' 37 It may not,
however, enact a statute that changes a decision of the court which adjudicated
130. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/20 (West 1994).
131. See In re Petition of John Doe and Jane Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 499 (1994) (declaring that certiorari was denied on November, 7 1994).
132. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 336.
133. Id. (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1979)).
134. Id. at 337; see In re Marriage of Cohn, 443 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. 1982).
135. Cohn, 443 N.E.2d at 542.
136. Id. at 549.
137. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 337.
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the rights of particular parties.' The court noted that the "filing of a petition
for rehearing does not alter the effective date of the judgment of a reviewing
court" unless the rehearing is allowed.139 If the rehearing is allowed, the
effective date of the judgment is synonymous with the rehearing date."4 The
court reasoned that since the petition for rehearing and writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was denied in the instant case, the effective date
of the judgment was June 16, 1994, prior to the passage of the Adoption Act
amendment. 41 Therefore, the Kirchnercourt held that on June 16, 1994, the
rights of all parties were fully adjudicated by the Illinois Supreme Court,
i 42
thereby rendering the subsequent amendment constitutionally inapplicable.
F.

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT TAKES A SECOND LOOK AT THE BABY
RICHARD CASE

During the Illinois Supreme Court's second look at the Baby Richard
case, it looked at more than just applying the Adoption Act amendment
retroactively. The Does, testing the retroactivity of an Illinois Statute
specifically passed in response to public outcry over the case, requested a
hearing. 43 In January 1995, the request was denied.'
Kirchner filed a
habeas corpus writ to obtain custody of Richard. 45 In February 1995, the
Illinois Supreme Court again followed with an opinion that granted the writ
and explained why the Does were not entitled to a custody hearing.' In the
majority opinion, the court ruled that Kirchner had standing to file his habeas
corpus petition because, as the child's father, no one had a better position than
he to represent the child's best interests. 47
A writ of habeas corpus is appropriate where the custody of a child is at
issue and the petitioner has no other recourse by which to seek custody rights
to his/her child. 14' The Does argued that Kirchner should not have been able
to seek the writ because a vacation of adoption does not necessarily require
that the custody of Richard should immediately go to him as his father. 49 The

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirchner, 349 N.E.2d at 329.
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Does also urged that sections of the Marriage and Dissolution Act, as well as
the Adoption Act, should govern the proceeding." s The Does also contended
that the writ was improper because Richard was not being kept from Kirchner
against Richard's will.' Finally, the Does argued that when factual questions
must be answered, a writ of habeas corpus petition must not be considered for
want of jurisdiction.'52 The majority disagreed on all points.'
The case law cited by the Does to support their position involved custody
hearings after vacated adoptions." 4 In Sullivan v. People ex rel. Heeney,'" the
court stated that in the case of a vacated adoption, a best interest custody
hearing must be granted to determine who should have custody of an
improperly adopted child. 5 6 The majority felt that the Does took language to
57
this effect out of context.
The Sullivan case dealt with a father who had abandoned his wife and
children for six years prior to the adoption proceeding.' 58 The appellate court
remanded that case to the trial court for a determination of the father's
fitness.'59 The Sullivan case states that a child may not stay with the adoptive
parents unless the natural parent is unfit."6 The hearing, therefore, was to
6
determine fitness and not best interests.' '
Since the Illinois Supreme Court had already determined that Kirchner
was a fit parent, there was no fitness issue to deal with in a subsequent
hearing. 62 A "best interests" custody hearing was not needed for this

reason. 163

The Does also cited Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home,' 64 which
stated that a married father could be denied rights to the child without a
finding of unfitness if it was in the child's best interest.' 65 The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that, although not tested, Giacopelliwould probably be

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 330.
153. Id. at 329-32.
154. Id. at 330-31.
155. 79 N.E. 695 (I11.1906).
156. Id. at 697.
157. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 330.
158. Sullivan, 79 N.E. at 695.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 697.
161. Id. at 696. The Sullivan case also stated that the natural parent's rights were
superior to the rights of any other person. Id.
162. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 330.
163. Id.
164. 158 N.E.2d 613 (I11.1959).
165. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 330; see also Giacopelli, 158 N.E.2d at 618.
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unconstitutional since married parents cannot be denied custody without first
showing unfitness. 166 Giacopelli also did not comport with recent Illinois
pronouncements on custody and adoption. 67 Under the Adoption Act, both
the superior right doctrine and the best interest standard are applied. 168 A third
party may not determine rights, including custody, unless unfitness is first
69
determined.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the Does had no standing to seek
a custody hearing under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act. 7 ° The
Does also argued that Kirchner had waived his right to challenge their status
by not filing a timely answer to their petition, which he had not raised until
three years later. 7 ' The court felt that this claim was meritless.' The Does'
petition was filed with their amended petition to adopt.'73 Therefore, when the
adoption was approved erroneously, there was no need for a hearing regarding
custody."'
The court believed that although due process is a right granted to unwed
fathers who accept responsibility for their children, there is no Federal law
regarding fathers who want to raise their children, but who are unable to do
so because of deception."7 This is what the Illinois Supreme Court ranted
about with regard to the alleged deceptive practices of the Does in keeping
Richard from Kirchner.7 6 The court decided that even though Daniella lied
about Richard and then signed away her parental rights, the waiver of rights
could not be imputed to Kirchner." In fact, Kirchner should be placed in the
same position as he would have been prior to the invalid adoption's
approval. 7 8 The court felt that custody of Richard should be immediately
granted to Kirchner as stipulated under the Adoption Act. 79 In fact, custody
should have automatically reverted to Kirchner at the time of the adoption's
invalidation. 0

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 331 n. 1.
Id.
Id. at 331-32.
Id.
Id. at 332-36.
Id. at 332.
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 332.
Id.
Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 334.
Id.
Id.
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The court claims that the Does misinterpreted section 601 of the
Adoption Act, which suggests that a petition for a custody hearing may be
filed by a non-parent if the child is not in the custody of one of his parents.'
The Marriage and Dissolution Act states that, "(b) A child custody proceeding
is commenced in the court: (2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a
petition for custody of the child in the county in which he is permanently
resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one of his
parents." ! 2 Taken in a literal sense, it appears on its face that the Does should
have qualified under the act."8 38 4 In Illinois, however, a special meaning is
given to the phrase "physical."1
For example, in In re Custody of Peterson, the father and mother had a
child and were subsequently divorced.8 5 The mother was awarded custody
6 When the mother
of the child and the father was granted visitation rights.
became ill, her parents had her move into their house so they could help take
care of the child. 7 The father continued to exercise his visitation right twice
a week. 8 Eventually, the mother died and the grandparents petitioned for
sole custody of the child. 9 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit
court had properly dismissed the petition for lack of standing under section
601(b)(2) of the Marriage Act and properly granted custody of the child to his
father."9 The court reasoned that the father had gained "physical custody" of
the child through reasonably exercising his visitation rights, thus barring the
19
grandparents from having standing to seek custody. ' The court went on to
say that to allow physical possession (at the time the petition for custody is
filed) to be the decisive factor on the standing issue would "encourage
abductions of minors in order to satisfy the literal terms of the 'standing
92
requirement and would, in reality, defeat the statutory intendment."'
On the other hand, in In re Custody of Menconi, 93 the court found that
the father did not have physical custody of his child when in fact at the time

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.

Id.; 750 IIL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601 (b)(2) (West 1992).

Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 334.
In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Il. 1986).
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Peterson, 491 N.E.2d at 1152-53.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
1983).
453 N.E.2d 835 (I11.
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he filed the petition for custody he literally had physical custody.'9 4 In
Menconi, the mother of the child died shortly after the little girl's birth. 195
Pursuant to section 8(a)(1) of the Adoption Act, where the birth mother is not
married to the father, his consent to the adoption is essential except where he
is found unfit by clear and convincing evidence.' 96 After the mother's death,
the father asked the grandparents to care for the child. 97 From December
1974, the day after her mother died, until April 11, 1981, the child lived
mostly in the care and custody of her grandparents.' 8 There were several
instances when the father would pick the child up, but keep her for only short
periods of time.' 99 Upon returning the child to her grandparents, the father
would state that he could not properly care for her.' Subsequently, the father
forcibly removed the child from her grandparents' house and refused to return
the child despite the grandparents' request.20 1 The grandparents filed a
petition for custody. In holding that the grandparents had standing to file their
petition, the court reasoned that the father had relinquished his physical
custody of the child in favor of the grandparents.2 2 Moreover, the child had
lived with the grandparents for six and one-half years with uninterrupted care
and custody.) 3 The court also emphasized the fact that the father's visitations
with the child were "sporadic" at best.' It is because of these decisions that
the court could reasonably deduce that under the Adoption
Act physical
2 5
custody was not synonymous with physical possession.
Baby Richard is certainly distinguishable from the Menconi case. Unlike
the father in the Meconi case, Kirchner demonstrated an interest in searching
for the child that he had been told was dead. The late night searches and the
calls to both the uncle's house and to the hospital were sufficient to establish

194. Id. at 839.
195. Id. at 836-37.
196. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 333. Included in the statutory factors for finding unfitness
is the section finding unfitness where a parent fails to "demonstrate a reasonable degree of
interest, concern and responsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during the first 30 days
after its birth." Id.; see 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (D)(1), 8(a)(1)(West 1992).
197. Menconi, 453 N.E.2d at 837.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.

201. Id.
202. Id. at 839.
203. Menconi, 453 N.E.2d at 839. What is even more interesting is that the court also
had an appointed psychologist, who determined that the child was firmly integrated into the
grandparents' household. Id. In addition, the relationship between the grandmother and the
child was like mother-daughter. Id.
204. Id.
205.

Id.
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Kirchner's physical custody of Richard. Therefore, the Does' possession of

Baby Richard did not establish technical custody of Richard, under the
6 Kirchner's actions, howmeaning of the Marriage and Dissolution Act.
ever, did establish custody.
II. THE DISSENT DISCUSSES THE NATURE OF

CUSTODY

Section A of Part II analyzes Justice McMorrow's dissenting opinion in
the Baby Richard case. Specifically, Section B explores standing to seek
custody under the Baby Richard Amendment according to Justice McMorrow.
Section C discusses retroactively applying the Baby Richard Amendment.
Section D analyzes Justice McMorrow's interpretation of Baby Richard's due
process rights.
A.

A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW BY JUSTICE MCMORROW

In her dissenting opinion, Justice McMorrow offered a different view of
the same laws.2"7 McMorrow made a distinction between the termination of
parental rights in an adoption proceeding and interference with parental rights
in custody hearings.2 8 A custody hearing under the Marriage and Dissolution
20 9 It simply
Act does not affect a permanent termination of parental rights.
provides a "lawful avenue for judicial supervision over the exercise of
parental rights because of a judicial determination that such custodial
2
arrangements will serve the best interests of the child." ' Furthermore, the
dissent asserts that the majority's opinion of Kirchner's superior position as
defender of Richard's interest is in fact both illogical and legally
problematic.2 ' The majority misconceived the guardian ad litem's role as the
representor of Richard's interest.' Kirchner represented no one's interest but
his own.213 The Does, however, represented both Richard's and their own
4
interests because of their familial relationship.21
Similarly, in a custody battle, the child becomes a ward of the court and
the court sees to the child's care and support until the child reaches

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 336.
Id. at 343 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 346 (McMorrow, J.,
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id. at 346-47 (McMorrow, J. dissenting).
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 347 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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majority." 5 The court, therefore, looks out for the best interest of the child.216
Daniella terminated her rights, placing Richard in the care of the State of
Illinois." 7 When the court vacated the adoption, the Does took on temporary
custody of Richard until his best interests could be determined.218
In addition, the dissent claims that the majority has skewed the role of
habeas corpus proceedings in child custody cases.2t 9 In several cases, a
natural parent was required to file a habeas corpus action in the circuit court
and then subject himself to a best interest hearing.220 Kirchner circumvented
a custody hearing; no discussion and debate over the child's best interests ever
took place.22'
The dissent also argues that the dismissal of the Giacopelli case was
erroneous because of the majority's "newly created law of biological
determinism." 2' This new principle of the "superior right of natural parents"
is not what was explained in several previous Illinois cases.223 In all such
cases, the right of the natural parent only manifests when it is accompanied by
the best interest of the child.22
The majority also misstated the facts in Giacopelliby failing to recognize
that Giacopellidealt with a custody hearing which occurred after a mother
terminated her parental rights.225 Based on the evidence given at the hearing
in Giacopelli,the court awarded custody of the child to the adoptive parents
because of the father's criminal background. 6 In the Baby Richard case, the
Illinois Supreme Court circumvented such a hearing and placed the child with
his biological father without determining what was in the child's best
interests.227
The dissent also cited People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston,22 where the
court held that a child should be with a party other than a biological parent if

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 347 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 348 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting).
223. Id. at 348-50 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting).
224. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 348-50 (McMorrow, J.,
dissenting).
225. Id. at 348 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The natural father asserted his rights at a
best interest hearing. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 247 N.E.2d 417 (I11.
1969).
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it is in the child's best interest.229 However, the majority in Richard's case
determined that Livingston was a probate case rather than an adoption case.23 °
Therefore, although the surrounding circumstances were similar, an allegedly
different standard would be applied to Richard's case.231 Interestingly, in the
Livingston case, although the child was ultimately placed with the non-parent,
the natural father was granted liberal visitation rights so that he could develop
a relationship with his child.232 Obviously, the majority did not want to
charter that course, even though this had been recognized as an acceptable
practice in several Illinois cases.233
Additionally, the dissent accuses the majority. of omitting "the myriad
appellate court cases which squarely embrace the best interests of the child
principle as determining custody," even when the natural parent may lose
custody to third parties.234
B.

STANDING TO SEEK CUSTODY UNDER THE BABY RICHARD AMENDMENT
ACCORDING TO JUSTICE MCMORROW

In McMorrow's dissent, she attacks the majority's denial of the Does'
standing with respect to the Marriage and Dissolution Act as well as the
enacted Baby Richard Amendment.235
The majority decided that the Does had no standing to seek custody of
Richard under the Marriage and Dissolution Act.236 Immediately after the first
Illinois Supreme Court decision on this case was entered, however, the
General Assembly passed legislation which amended the Illinois Adoption
Act.237 This amendment made a custody hearing mandatory promptly
following a vacation of an adoption.23 Under the amendment, participants in
such hearings include adoptive parents and natural parents who have not yet
terminated their parental rights. 239

229. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 348-49 (McMorrow, J., dissenting); Livingston, 247
N.E.2d at 421.

230.

Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 349 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).

233.

Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 349 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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235.
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238.
50/20(b)).
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Id. at 350-51.
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Id. at 336.
Id. at 336; Pub. Act 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994 (adding 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN.
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The majority denied the hearing under the new amendment based on two
grounds. First, that the adjudication of the matter was final at the time of the
amendment. Second, that the General Assembly had no position to act as a
"court of last resort" in cases, and could not enact and apply legislation
retroactively while purposefully trying to change the outcome of a case.240
Therefore, applying the amendment retroactively was not sanctioned under the
24
law.

1

The majority looked at the legislative history of the amendment and
decided that it was clear in the General Assembly's record that the legislators
had the Baby Richard case specifically in mind when adding the mandatory
hearing language to the statute.24 2 The majority cited In re Marriage of
Cohn243 which held that a statute may only change the law interpreted by the
court prospectively. 2 " The court decided in the Cohn case not to apply the
legislation retroactively because the legislature cannot change a statute "with
the explicit intent to overrule the decision of a reviewing court. 245
The Does argued that the amendment was not designed to alter the
court's decision to vacate the adoption.' 6 Instead, the legislature intended to
clarify what happens after the vacated adoption takes place.7 Thus, the court
should apply the amendment to the present case.248 The majority did not
accept their reasoning. 249
In McMorrow's dissent, she explains why she feels that the Does do
indeed have standing. 250 First, she chastises the majority for repeatedly
reverting to their rationale for precluding a custody hearing on best interest:
that the Does engaged in "deceit," "subterfuge" and "false pleadings. 25'
McMorrow states that nowhere is it asserted by either of the Kirchners that the
Does' conduct was fraudulent and conspiratorial. 252 Neither the Does, nor
their attorneys, were ever charged with or convicted of misconduct, and there
is nothing in the record to support the majority's accusations.253 The majority,

.240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 337-38.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
443 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. 1982).
Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 337; Cohn, 443 N.E.2d at 549.
Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 337.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 351.

252. Id. at 351-52 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 352 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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the dissent concludes, uses empty accusations of misconduct to support its

2 54
conclusion regarding standing.
The Marriage Act provides that a child custody hearing is initiated "by
a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the
county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in
'
Even Kirchner did not deny
the physical custody of one of his parents."255
256
that the Does satisfied the requirements under the plain language of the
statute.257
Kirchner, however, argued that case law required a voluntary relinquishhearing. 258
ment of custody by the natural parent as a prerequisite to a custody
The majority failed to realize that the purpose of a custody hearing in either
a habeas corpus motion or in accordance with the Marriage Act is not custody
nor possession nor termination of rights.259 The hearing is to determine the
best interest of the child. 2' 6
The majority's application of In Re Peterson was incorrect because the
261
facts in Peterson and in the case at bar were not parallel. In Peterson, the
262
The
child was first in the custody of the natural mother until her death.
had
father
natural
the
because
motion
custody
grandparents'
the
court denied
263
the
use
not
could
The grandparents
been exercising his visitation rights.
264
father.
natural
the
to
custody
deny
to
"fortuity" of the mother's death
The standing under the Marriage Act has not been used to prevent
265
It does
custody claims by people who have cared for children as parents.
protect against temporary caretakers, such as camp counselors and headmasless
ters, from filing claims. 26 The majority's opinion that the Does had
267
absurd.
"patently
is
custody
seeking
counselor
camp
a
than
standing
The fact that the Does developed a strong familial bond with Richard has
been subject to a great deal of criticism. 268 The purpose of the standing
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255.
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requiremeoat was to protect the custody rights of the natural parent and also the
environmental stability of the child.269 The court needed to look at Richard's
circumstances to determine the standing of the adoptive parents 2. 70 The Does
acted in accordance with the law throughout the proceeding and no wrongdoing was ever asserted in any of the proceedings.2 7' Furthermore, the dissent
adds that the majority, in imputing the alleged bad acts to the Does, tries to
72
taint the Does standing in order to prevent the custody hearing.2
C.

A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE BABY RICHARD AMENDMENT
ACCORDING TO JUSTICE MCMORROW

The dissent also tried to shed light on a different interpretation of the
Baby Richard amendment.273 Justice Morrow felt that the language of the
statutory amendment left no doubt as to the intent of the legislators.274
Therefore, the Does would be entitled to the hearing unless the amendments
do not apply or the statute is unconstitutional.275
Although the majority held that the statute could not be applied
retroactively, the dissent stated otherwise.276 On July 3, 1994, the amendment
became effective. 277 The Does' motions had not been completely exhausted
until months later.278 The majority wanted to call the end of the final adoption
appeal (June 16, 1994) the end of the case.279 According to the dissent, the
majority's position in this matter lacks support.280 The law states that
"[w]here the legislature changes the law pending an appeal, the case must be
disposed of by the reviewing court under the law as it then exists, not as it was
when the judgment was entered in the lower court. '281 Therefore, since the
Does' petition for rehearing was still pending on July 3rd, the amendment
should have been applied.2 82

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 354 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id.
Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 354 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id. at 355-56 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 356 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

281.

Id. at 356-57 (McMorow, J., dissenting) (quoting Bates v. Board of Education, 555

280.

Id.

N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1990)).
282. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 357 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

The dissent also criticized the idea that the custody hearing would
3
diminish Kirchner's rights to custody." The majority failed to realize that
Kirchner's custody rights were unchanged at the time the adoption was
overturned because the first Illinois Supreme Court decision never addressed
custody.28 4 Rather, it addressed whether Kirchner's parental rights should
have been terminated.28 5 There is no Illinois law prior to this that states that
once an adoption is vacated, child custody "automatically reverts to an unwed
biological father. 28 6 It was a separate matter that needed to be separately
litigated.28 7
Likewise, the dissent agreed that separation of powers precluded the
legislature from enacting law that tampers with the results of litigation
pending in the courts. 288 However, the dissent cited previous cases which
the need in some cases for the legislature to define unclear
recognized
28 9
statutes.
D.

DUE PROCESS FOR BABY RICHARD ACCORDING TO JUSTICE
MCMORROW

The final issue in the case was deciding the due process rights of
Richard. The issue raised by the Does and Richard's guardian ad litem was
whether Richard himself had a liberty interest in the familial relationship he
had developed with the Does. 2' Their claim was based on the theory that just
as Kirchner has a liberty interest in his relationship with Richard, Richard
should have a liberty interest-in his current relationship with his current
parents.29 The majority found that children have due process rights, but their
292
rights are not independent of the rights of their fit parent. Any losses that
a child might suffer do not create a liberty interest in the continued mainte93
nance of the adoptive relationship.2 Therefore, the relationship that Richard
had with his adoptive parents could not be legitimized because it had
294
continued despite the procedural safeguards afforded by law. It is possible
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that the court felt that the liberty interest of the father was superior to that of
Richard's. Perhaps they may have adopted the reasoning of the Quilloin case,
which stated, "[wie have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the

children's best interest. "295

The dissent, however, objected by stating that a protected liberty interest
required a legitimate claim of entitlement.29 The dissent argued that Richard
was deprived of his rights as granted by statute. 297 By statute, Richard had the
right to a best interest hearing.29 The majority stifled Richard's liberty
interest and best interest custody hearing right by granting Kirchner's writ of
habeas corpus. 2" The adoption of Richard was invalidated.3" Kirchner's
parental rights were not terminated, 3°" but these two proceedings were
completely different from the custody hearing afforded by law.' The hearing
officer may have found that it was in Richard's best interests to be with his
biological father.3" 3 It will never be known because the procedural rights
afforded by law were not carried out. 3"
IlI. WHAT CAN THE PARTIES Do Now: A LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITIES OF
FUTURE BABY RICHARD LITIGATION
At this point in time the Does do not have standing to request a hearing
regarding the custody of Richard under section 601(b)(2) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.30 5 The statutory language of
"physical custody" requires a determination of who is providing for the care,
custody, and welfare of the child before the beginning of a custody proceeding.3" Kirchner has been and continues to provide for Richard's care, custody
and welfare. Furthermore, Kirchner has given no indication that he has any
295. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S.Ct. 549, 555 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2119 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
296. Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 360-61 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.

300. Id.
301. Id.

Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 361 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
305. 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b)(2) (West 1992).
306. In re Kulawiak, 628 N.E.2d 431, 435 (I11.App. Ct. 1993)(citing In re Marriage of
Nichols, 524 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)).
302.
303.
304.
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future plans to "voluntarily or indefinitely relinquish" custody of his son.
Although Daniella is not recognized as having any legal right to Richard, the
fact that she is in physical possession of Richard is not enough to show that
Kirchner does not have physical custody of Richard.3 7 A previous court
decision held that a father had not given up physical custody of his daughter
even though she was residing with her maternal grandparents for the past two
years.308 In that case, the natural mother and daughter were living with the

grandparents until the mother's death. 3" The Illinois Supreme Court has

firmly established that a parent does not relinquish custody of his child by not
living with the child. 1 In Kirchner's case, he could never live with Richard
again, but still retain custody of him under the law. The Does will have to

look elsewhere in the law in order to have a chance at getting Richard back.
A.

EVENTS WHICH MUST OCCUR FOR THE DOES TO GET RICHARD BACK

In order for the Does to get Richard back, there is a sequence of events
that must occur. First, someone would have to contact The Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) to complain that Kirchner is abusing
or neglecting Richard. DCFS would then have to investigate the complaint
and find that Kirchner was abusing or neglecting Richard. According to the
Juvenile Court Act, a child must be a ward of the court in order for the state
to have jurisdiction to file in Juvenile Court and proceed to termination. 3"
Terminating parental rights is a two part process.3" 2 First, a parent must be
found unfit and then a best interest hearing is conducted.31 3 The courts must
find unfitness prior to considering best interest evidence.3" 4 When parental
307. See In re the Marriage of Sechrest, 560 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(stating that the standing requirement is not based on who is in actual possession of the child
when the custody petition is filed).
308. In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ill. 1986).
309. Id. at 1151. The grandparents tried to assert standing under the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, but the Illinois Supreme Court found that they did not have
standing because although they did have possession of the child, the father had exercised regular
visitation twice a week, and did not show any intent to voluntarily or indefinitely relinquish his
rights to custody of his daughter. Id. at 1153.
310. See In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324,340 (Ill. 1995) (holding that a father
can regain custody of his child after the child was improperly removed from his custody); see
also In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (11. 1986) (holding a father can regain
custody of his daughter even though the child resided with her grandparents for a period of
time).
311. 705 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-29.
312. In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183-84 (11. 1990) (stating that the best
interest of the child is not to be considered until the parent is found to be unfit).
313. Id.
314. Id.
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rights are sought to be permanently severed, the best interest of the child can
only be considered "if the courts find by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent is unfit." ' The court would have to find that Kirchner was unfit
pursuant to the Adoption Act. Once the court has found Kirchner unfit, a best
interest hearing would be conducted to determine if it would be in Richard's
best interest to return to the Does.
Terminating parental rights is a serious action taken by the courts. Due
to the serious and permanent nature of the decision to terminate parental
rights, the Illinois Supreme Court has said that when the State seeks to
terminate parental rights, it must prove that a parent is unfit by "clear and
convincing" evidence.316 Using this standard of proof strikes a fair balance
between the rights of natural parents and the state's legitimate concerns
regarding the welfare of a child." 7 The various states are free to determine
whether or not they would like the precise burden of proof to be equal to or
greater than "clear and convincing," but the standard of proof cannot be any
less.3"'
The party seeking to terminate a parent's parental rights has the burden
of proving that a parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence. 9 Unfitness
may be based upon "any one or more" of the grounds listed in The Adoption
320
Act.
B.

FINDING KIRCHNER UNFIT ON GROUNDS OF FAILING TO MAINTAIN A
REASONABLE DEGREE OF INTEREST, ABANDONMENT OR DESERTION

At this point in Kirchner's situation, the only realistic way his parental
rights would be terminated would be if the court found that he has failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest in Richard, that he has abandoned
Richard, or that he has deserted Richard.
1.

Failing to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest

A court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as
to the child's welfare to find that parent unfit under Section l(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act.32 1 In order to determine if a parent has failed to maintain a
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id. at 182-84.
Id.

Id.

Id. at 183.

750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 1992).

Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 182. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(d)(b)(West 1992).
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reasonable degree of concern, interest or responsibility as to the child's
welfare, the case must be examined in light of the parent's circumstances.32 2
Most often, a parent's rights are terminated under this standard when the
parent has failed to visit or tried to visit the child, or has failed to maintain any
sort of personal contact with the child.323 The courts take into consideration
the parent's difficulty in finding transportation to the child's residence, actions
and statements made by others to hinder or discourage visitation, or whether
324
the parent's lack of visits with the child was motivated by true indifference.
If visiting the child is not practical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts may
325
demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility.
Courts focus on a parent's efforts to communicate with a child and show some
interest in the child, not on how successful those efforts are.326
Additionally, courts do not penalize a parent for moving out of the state
where the child resides if the parent shows that it was necessary to move for
financial reasons or other family obligations.3 27 Normally, lack of contact or
concern with the child must continue over a substantial period of time. The
parent must have made no efforts to speak to or see the child for at least six
months before the court will consider terminating the parent's rights.
In a case where a parent attempted to keep in contact with her child, but
was prevented from doing so by the child's father and his parents, she was not
found unfit for failure to maintain a reasonable degree of concern about her
child's welfare and thus her rights could not be terminated. 328 In the Syck
case, the mother had not seen her child for over five years and lived out of
state, but her attempts to communicate were enough to show that she tried to
maintain contact and cared about her child's welfare.329 Since the court
examines each case in light of its particular circumstances, the court in Syck
took into account the mother's "limited education and the restrictions that it
put on her employment opportunities, her poor financial condition, her young
age, and the absence of any substantial emotional support ....
,a30 The court

322. Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 182-83.
323. Id. at 182-84.
324. Id. at 185.
325. Id. Demonstrating a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility by
actions other than personal visits is dependent upon the "content, tone, and frequency of those
contacts under the circumstances" of the case. Id.
326. Id. (citing In re Drescher, 415 N.E.2d 636, 641 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980)).
327. Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 186. To terminate a particular parent's parental rights, the
courts must find that there is clear and convincing evidence that a level of reasonable interest
and concern was not maintained. Id. at 185-86.
328. Id.
329. Id.

330. Id. at 186.
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noted that while such facts do not excuse a complete absence of communication with one's child, they do relate to the reasonableness of the communication that a parent attempts to maintain with the child.33
Terminating Kirchner's parental rights under this standard would be
difficult under the present circumstances. If the newspaper stories are correct
about the situation, Kirchner has been seeing his children weekly, calling them
regularly, and giving his wife money to help support them. Even if Kirchner
moved back to Czechoslovakia, he could still maintain a reasonable degree of
concern for Richard by calling and sending cards regularly, and visiting a few
times a year. If Kirchner stopped visiting Richard for a period of at least six
months, with no adequate explanation for his actions, then this could be used
as evidence that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern,
interest or responsibility as to the welfare of Richard, and his rights could be
legally terminated under this section of the statute. Additionally, if Kirchner
moved a far distance from Richard, and did not make an effort to communicate with him either by calling him or sending him letters, the courts could
terminate his rights under the statute. If this happened, the courts would
probably terminate his parental rights in light of the circumstances that
surround this whole case; that Kirchner fought so hard to get his son back just
to leave him a year and a half later. The Does would have to wait at least six
months, but realistically much longer, before they could get Richard back into
their home. Realistically, termination proceedings can last for years.
2.

Abandonment

Another way that Kirchner's parental rights could be terminated is if the
33 2
court found that Kirchner abandoned Richard under the Adoption Act.
"Abandonment is conduct on the part of a parent which demonstrates a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and to relinquish all parental claims to the
'
child."333
The evidence must show that the parent, through his actions,
intended to forego permanently all parental obligations and claims.33 4 Any
evidence of interference with the parent's efforts to contact the child will
defeat any claim of abandonment.335
The question of intention is one to be determined by the evidence. Under
this standard, the evidence must show that the parent intended to give up their
parental rights and responsibilities. This means that even if a parent's actions
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(a) (West 1996).
App. Ct. 1972).
In re Petition to Adopt Cech, 291 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill.
Id.
750 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8 (West 1996).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

show that the parent has realistically left his child's care and responsibility of
that child to another, the court cannot terminate the parent's rights under the
abandonment standard unless the parent intended to relinquish their rights as
a parent. It must be clear from the evidence that the. parent intended to
relinquish the child or abandon it.336 The court may terminate the parent's
right for failure to maintain a reasonable amount of concern, interest and
responsibility for the child's welfare, but not for abandonment.
If Kirchner were to leave his child and tell Daniella that he no longer
wanted responsibility for Richard, this would be evidence of an intention to
forego all his parental responsibilities and duties. If Kirchner leaves for
Czechoslovakia and tells Daniella that he does not care about Richard and
does not want the responsibility of being his father, this action could
constitute abandonment and his parental rights could be terminated. However,
if Kirchner just leaves the care of Richard to Daniella and does not intend to
forego his parental obligations, he cannot be found to have abandoned Richard
unless he vanishes from his life for a substantial period of time. A mother's
rights were terminated upon showing that she had abandoned her son for the
first six years of his life even when it was shown that she later began visiting
him in an effort to win his return home to her. 337 If Kirchner were to abandon
Richard for a period of years, then his rights could be terminated for
abandonment even if he did not intend to relinquish custody of Richard. The
problem with abandonment is that the Does would have to wait until Richard
was in his teens to try and get him back. Terminating Kirchner's rights for
abandonment would be very difficult to prove, but terminating his parental
rights by desertion is another matter.
3.

Desertion

Unlike abandonment, a parent can be found unfit on grounds of desertion
when he or she has demonstrated through his or her conduct an intention to
relinquish custody of the child permanently, but not to relinquish all legal
claims to the child.338 Involuntary separations do not constitute desertion.339
This means that even if Kirchner were put in jail in another state, he could not
be found to have deserted Richard. 340 He could be found unfit pursuant to
other sections of the statute, but not for desertion.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

In re Sanders, 395 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
In re J.B., 549 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Il1.App. Ct. 1989).
In re R.B.W., 548 N.E.2d 1085, 1100 (I11.App. Ct. 1989).
Bryant v. Lenza, 412 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
Id.
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The difference between abandonment and desertion is that a finding of
abandonment requires the court to find that a parent intended to relinquish all
legal claims to the child. Desertion requires the parent to permanently
terminate custody over the child or intend to give up custody. 4 Intent to give
up custody is easier to prove than intent to give up all legal rights to the child.
If Kirchner were to tell Daniella that he did not want custody of Richard and
that she could keep him, his parental rights could be terminated if it is shown
that he fails to communicate with Richard at all.
Additionally, if Kirchner fails to have contact with Richard for more than
three months prior to the termination proceeding, he can be found to have
deserted Richard. This is not to say that if he has to go back home for more
than three months, his parental rights will be terminated because he has been
gone, but, if he leaves and his conduct shows an intention to relinquish
custody, his rights may be terminated. Furthermore, if Kirchner has no
contact with Richard for over three months and a petition to terminate his
parental xights is sought, this lack of contact for three months prior to the
petition may show evidence of an intent to relinquish custody of Richard. It
would be much easier to terminate Kirchner's rights under this section than
under abandonment because as history has shown, Kirchner will probably
never show any specific intent to relinquish all legal rights to his son.
The Does should watch Kirchner's actions very carefully in the next few
months because Kirchner could show conduct that would evidence a finding
of parental unfitness under the sections discussed above. Terminating
Kirchner's rights is only the beginning of the battle for the Does. After
Kirchner's parental rights are terminated, under the law, a best interest hearing
would be held to determine if it would be in Richard's best interest to return
to the Does permanently. This is where the fight for Richard becomes more
difficult.
C.

THE SECOND STEP IN THE PROCESS: THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

After a parent is found unfit under the Adoption Act, the court must then
look at best interest evidence.42 Although a parent may be found unfit to have
custody of his/her children, it does not follow that the parent cannot remain
'
the child's legal parent with "the attendant rights and privileges."343
Once
evidence of parental unfitness is found, however, "all of the parent's rights

341.
342.
343.

Cech, 291 N.E.2d at 23.
Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 183-84.
Lael v. Warga, 508 N.E.2d 1095, 1099-1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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must yield to the best interest of the child." 3" There are many factors to
consider when deciding what is in the child's best interest: effect of termination on the child, presence of an adoptive home, bonding of the child to foster
parents, age of the child, the child's wishes if he or she is fourteen or older,
continued contact with siblings, and the child's adjustment to his home, school
and community. 3 Unfortunately, even if Kirchner's parental rights are
terminated, the Does would not have much chance of getting Richard back in
light of the best interest evidence.
Richard has already been torn from one home. The court would never
put him through this again if the evidence proved that Daniella was taking
good care of him. Richard now has a sister, and it would be hard to imagine
that being placed back with the Does would be in his best interest. First of all,
by the time Kirchner's parental rights were terminated, Richard would
probably be about eight or nine. He would have been in Kirchner's home for
at least four or five years. It would be doubtful that any evidence would prove
that it would be in Richard's best interest to be removed from Daniella's
home. Although Daniella is not recognized as Richard's parent under the law
(because she voluntarily signed away those rights when she put Richard up for
adoption), at this point in time, Richard recognizes her as his mother. She can
get legal custody of Richard if the court finds that it is in Richard's best
interest to stay with her.
The only way that the Does would get Richard back is if evidence was
presented to the court that showed Daniella was not adequately providing for
Richard, either by neglecting him, not attending to his physical needs, not
attending to his educational needs, or that she has a drug or alcohol problem.
Even if Daniella was found to have one of the above mentioned problems, the
court and DCFS would most likely try to help her overcome her problems
before removing Richard. Due to Richard's past legal history, the court would
probably be very apprehensive about removing him from Daniella's care. The
court may want to give Richard back to the Does to make up for the 1995
decision, and the public would probably applaud, but Richard's best interest
would probably be served by remaining with Daniella Kirchner.

344. In re T.G., 498 N.E.2d 370, 373 (11. App. Ct. 1986)(emphasis in original).
345. 750 I1. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 1992); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12
(West 1992); 750 IL1.COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/6 (West 1992); 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1
(West 1992).
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D.

WHO-IS TO BLAME?

As the debate goes on, so will the blame. The general public is quick to
criticize Justice Heiple for his notorious opinion in the Kirchner case. Even
Governor Edgar in his annual state address in January 1997, included criticism
of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. In the middle of his address, during
the portion about violence toward children, Edgar said, "And speaking of
children... I hope this year the judicial system in Illinois can find a way to
'
try to bring a fair, happy ending to the Baby Richard tragedy."346
When one
reads the case closely, however, Justice Heiple is quick to place the blame on
the adoptive parents.
In his opinion, Justice Heiple took a moment to address the length of time
it took to resolve the matter. He stated that it was unfortunate that over three
years of the baby's life had to elapse before the final judgment.347 Moreover,
he went on to state that the fault lies initially with the mother, who fraudulently tried to deprive the father of his rights, and next, with the adoptive
parents and their attorney, who proceeded with the adoption when they were
aware that a real father existed who was denied knowledge of his baby's
existence.' He further stated that when the father entered his appearance in
the adoption proceedings fifty-seven days after the baby's birth and demanded
his rights as a father, the petitioners should have relinquished the baby at that
time. 9 "It was the adoptive parents decision to prolong this litigation through
a long and ultimately fruitless appeal." 350
On Justice Heiple's behalf, his duty is to interpret the law and to see to
it that it is administered to all properly. The law by which the case was
resolved was strictly followed, and that is why Kirchner was eventually
awarded custody of the child. Chances are, the majority of the population is
ignorant of the facts of this case. Few know that both the Does and their
attorney acquiesced in Daniella's scheme to fake the death of her child. This
is definitely an act that is not worth rewarding. On the other hand, why should
an innocent child suffer the consequences?
When viewed strictly from the child's point of view, what matters most
is finding the distinction between recognizing the natural parent-child
relationship and terminating an existing relationship. Although these issues

346. Christi Parsons and Courtney Challos, Justice calls 'Baby Richard' Criticism
Unfair, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, January 23, 1997, at 10.
347. In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 190 (I1. 1994) (Heiple, J., in support of the
denial of rehearing).
348. Id. at 188.
349. Id.
350. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

are addressed in every custody case, they are often lost in the heat of
advocacy. In the heat of the courtroom, the focus tends to be not on the child,
but rather on scrutinizing the actions of everyone but the child prior to the
taking or the relinquishing of that child. When all is said and done, several
years have passed and the child has developed a relationship with those he has
been living with. The Kirchner line of court proceedings should not have
taken three or four years to resolve. Whatever the facts of a particular case,
courts must be cognizant of the toll that lengthy proceedings exact on a young
child's life.
IV. Is THERE A SOLUTION?
One proposed alternative would be to give the child the right to decide.
It is, however, superficially appealing at best in that it runs counter to the
complexity of what it means to be a child. As dependents, children are almost
universally incompetent under the law until they reach majority. More
specifically, in Illinois they are not permitted to make decisions about their
lives while still in minority. As a result, the responsibility for making life
decisions rests in the hands of the parent. This seems like the only logical
choice because children at very young ages are more apt to decide not based
upon what is best for them, but upon who is influencing them more at the
time.
In recognition that children cannot speak for themselves, the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem to make decisions based upon the best interests of
the child. However, all this resolves to do is mix in another adult into the heat
of the battle. Moreover, who is to say that the guardian would be making
those decisions based upon the best interests of the child. The guardian
ultimately makes choices based upon his view of what is best for the child, not
the child's view. Thus, a measure giving the child the right to decide would
probably never pass the door step of the legislature.
Judging from recent events, it would appear that the most logical solution
would be to expand the "interest" requirement of the natural parent seeking
to attain custody of the child. In Kirchner, the court held that Kirchner
displayed a sufficient amount of interest in trying to reunite with his son. He
searched through garbage cans for diapers, he repeatedly called the home in
which Daniella was staying and he called several hospitals to inquire about the
status of his baby. However, Kirchner is now separated from Daniella once
again and he has chosen to leave his children with her. Somehow, these recent
events do not seem as shocking as they should.
When a parent seeks to assert his paternity rights, stricter standards
should be applied to make certain that the parent not only has an interest in his
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child, but has the character that illustrates unconditional feelings for that child
as well. Without certainty, many situations may end up like this one and the
parent may all of a sudden disappear.
CONCLUSION

The Baby Richard case, to some, signified everything that was wrong
with our judicial system. There was something very troublesome in allowing
an innocent child to be torn from one family in order to be placed with
another. The future is sure to bring about some changes regarding the custody
of children. That much is apparent from the recent legislation that has been
passed. However, legislatures can create as many laws as they want, but such
laws will not make a difference if the amount of time taken to administer these
laws through the court system takes three to four years in each case. For every
new piece of legislation there is a new twist of facts that only complicates
matters further. Life for a child, much less an adult, does not put itself on hold
for the judicial system. In some respects, a whole life flashes by during court
proceedings. Nevertheless, the legislature must consider not only the most
efficient laws, but the ones that elicit the fastest result as well.
Yet from the horror, perhaps came some good. The legislation amending
the Adoption Act may not have helped Richard, but it may someday affect the
life of another child. Only time will tell what the future will bring for adopted
children who are caught in the web of our court system.

